Bridging Constitutional Regulations and International Standards in Political Finance: Preventing Electoral Corruption from a Comparative Perspective: Bridging Constitutional Regulations and International Standards in Political Finance: Preventing Electoral Corruption from a Comparative Perspective

Mad Romli; Indah  Riyanti; Sunisa  Dokmaipoom

doi:10.56107/penalaw.v4i1.310

Authors

Mad Romli Doctor of Law Studies Program, Postgraduate Program - Jayabaya University, Indonesia
Indah Riyanti Doctor of Law Studies Program, Postgraduate Program - Jayabaya University, Indonesia
Sunisa Dokmaipoom Rajamangala University Of Technology Krungthep, Thailand

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.56107/penalaw.v4i1.310

Keywords:

Political Financing; Electoral Corruption; Constitutional Law; UNCAC; International Legal Standards

Abstract

Electoral corruption triggered by opaque political financing systems poses a serious threat to democratic integrity in many countries. Although international legal instruments such as UNCAC and GRECO guidelines have established principles of transparency and accountability, many national constitutions have not effectively adopted these norms. This study analyzes the normative and institutional gaps between constitutional regulations and international standards in political financing in five jurisdictions: Indonesia, Germany, the United States, Brazil, and South Korea. Using a legal-normative approach and comparative law methods, it finds that the absence of constitutional recognition of political financing principles weakens the effectiveness of oversight and opens space for systemic electoral corruption. This article contributes to the global discourse by proposing a hybrid legal model that combines constitutional transparency mandates, the independence of oversight institutions, and public accountability mechanisms. This study encourages the harmonization of national political financing regimes with international anti-corruption frameworks to strengthen democratic legitimacy and governance.

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Bridging Constitutional Regulations and International Standards in Political Finance: Preventing Electoral Corruption from a Comparative Perspective